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Defending Patagonia: Mergers and
Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations
J. Haskell Murray*
Yvon Chouinard, founder of Patagonia, stated that “benefit
corporation legislation creates the legal framework to enable missiondriven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through
succession, capital raises, and even changes in ownership.” This
article uses Patagonia, one of the most visible benefit corporations, in
the article’s examination of Chouinard’s claim and in the article’s
exploration of issues surrounding benefit corporations in the mergers
and acquisitions context.
Of special interest are the seminal Delaware cases of Unocal and
Revlon, and how, if at all, the tests created by those cases should be
applied to benefit corporations. This article concludes that the
Unocal test could be used to evaluate takeover defenses erected by
benefit corporations, but argues that the test should be modified to
more clearly allow directors to protect the mission of their benefit
corporation, even if the mission “openly eschews shareholder wealth
maximization.” A more difficult issue arises when the break-up or
sale of a benefit corporation becomes inevitable and the benefit
corporation, incorporated in a state that follows Delaware law, enters
“Revlon-mode.” To provide a practical corporate governance
framework, this article concludes that Revlon should remain relevant
for benefit corporations that are incorporated in states following
Delaware law, but proposes statutory amendments requiring a
partial-asset lock and an annual charitable giving floor to ensure
public benefit.

* J. Haskell Murray is an assistant professor at Regent University School of Law. This
article was prepared for the Hasting Business Law Journal’s symposium entitled “Incorporating
Change: How Social Benefit Legislation is Reshaping the Corporate Outlook.” The author
thanks for their comments: Bill Baxley, David Groshoff, and Alicia Plerhoples. Samuel
Moultrie and Kevin Hoffman provided excellent research assistance. The opinions expressed
and any errors made are solely those of the author.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework to
enable mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay missiondriven through succession, capital raises, and even changes in
ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, and
1
high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.
—Yvon Chouinard, Founder of Patagonia

In early January 2012, Patagonia became one of the first
California benefit corporations. 2 Patagonia also became one of the
largest corporations, and perhaps the most well-known corporation in
the United States, to convert to a benefit corporation. This article
explores the above-quoted claim of Patagonia’s founder, Yvon
Chouinard. Will the benefit corporation statutes enable companies
like Patagonia to preserve their mission in the face of hostile takeover
threats? To what extent should the benefit corporation statutes
protect against such threat?
While Patagonia is a privately held California benefit
corporation, this article explores possibilities that include envisioning
Patagonia as a publicly traded corporation and Patagonia as a
Delaware benefit corporation (or a benefit corporation in a state that
closely follows Delaware law, because Delaware does not yet have a
benefit corporation statute). 3 No stretch of the imagination is needed
to envision a future Patagonia as a publicly traded company and some
version of a benefit corporation statute being enacted in Delaware.
Part II of this article provides a brief background on Patagonia
and on the benefit corporation statutes. Part III examines how a
court following Unocal 4 and its progeny might analyze takeover
defenses erected by benefit corporations, taking special interest in the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2010 case of eBay v. Newmark. 5 Part
1. Patagonia Registers as First California Benefit Corporation, CSR WIRE (Jan., 30, 2012),
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/33565-Patagonia-Registers-as-First-California-BenefitCorporation.
2. Id.
3. Yvon Chouinard currently controls Patagonia’s stock. Seth Stevenson, Patagonia’s
Founder Is America’s Most Unlikely Business Guru, WSJ (Apr. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424052702303513404577352221465986612.html. A few days before the final
edits on this article were due, statutory amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law
allowing the creation of “public benefit corporations” were proposed. Haskell Murray,
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, SOCENTLAW (March 20, 2013),
http://socentlaw.com/2013/03/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-legislation.
4. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
5. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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IV ventures into Revlon-land and argues that Revlon should remain
relevant in the benefit corporation context. 6 Part V examines and
evaluates preexisting potential ways a company like Patagonia could
protect its mission. Part VI discusses solutions offered by the existing
benefit corporation statutes, suggests modifications to those statutes,
and builds on the author’s previous work on benefit corporation
governance by focusing on the mergers and acquisitions context.7
Finally, the article concludes that an appropriately modified benefit
corporation statute could reduce “mission drift,” also known as
“mission creep,” but would not and should not create an absolute
lock on the corporation’s original mission. 8

II. PATAGONIA AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
A. PATAGONIA: THE FLAGSHIP BENEFIT CORPORATION
Rock climber, surfer, and environmentalist Yvon Chouinard
founded the outdoor clothing company Patagonia, Inc. in 1973.9
Patagonia recently recorded over $500 million in annual sales, 10 has
been dubbed “the coolest company on the planet,” 11 and aspires to
“use business to inspire and implement solutions to the
environmental crisis.” 12 In his most recent book, The Responsible
Company, Chouinard acknowledges that Patagonia is not perfect, but
states that the company seriously seeks to benefit society and the
environment. 13 Patagonia’s numerous social and environmental
6. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
7. See generally J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085000 (discussing benefit corporation
governance, but only briefly mentioning the mergers and acquisitions context).
8. Professor Jenkins defines “mission creep” as “an organizational phenomenon in which
entities inadvertently, over time, stray from their fundamental mission by engaging in activities
or behaviors less closely related to the core charitable purpose.” Garry W. Jenkins, Who's
Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 805 n.212 (2011).
9. YVON CHOUINARD, LET MY PEOPLE GO SURFING: THE EDUCATION OF A
RELUCTANT BUSINESSMAN 38–44 (2006).
10. Patagonia, The World’s 50 Most Innovative Companies, FAST COMPANY,
www.fastcompany. com/most-innovative-companies/2012/patagonia (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
11. Susan Casey, Patagonia: Blueprint for Green Business, FORTUNE, Apr. 2, 2007, at 62,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/04/02/8403423/
index.htm.
12. YVON CHOUINARD & VINCENT STANLEY, THE RESPONSIBLE COMPANY (back cover)
(2012).
13. See CHOUINARD & STANLEY, supra note 12, at 5.
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initiatives include providing health care to part-time workers,
providing flexible working schedules, enforcing a code of conduct on
all primary suppliers, using primarily environmentally preferred
materials, and donating one percent of sales to environmental
NGOs. 14
On November 9, 2012, Chouinard turned 74 years old. 15 Like all
of us, he will die. It is reasonable to assume, especially given the
opening quote, that he would like his life’s work to continue after he
is gone. It is also reasonable to assume that he would want Patagonia
to continue to operate in an environmentally friendly manner and
support environmental causes after he is gone. While completely
preventing “mission drift” may be neither possible nor necessarily
desirable, benefit corporation law could help ensure that a mission
shift is reasonably difficult and that at least a portion of the assets are
devoted to the intended corporate mission. 16 The benefit corporation
statutes may provide additional valuable protection for risk-averse
managers and could serve as a valuable warning device to possible
acquirers. 17 While this article suggests that the current benefit
corporation statutes are far from perfect, there is reason to believe
benefit corporation statutes, coupled with statutory amendments
suggested in this article, could be useful in defending the missions of
companies like Patagonia. 18

B. BRIEF HISTORY OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
In 2007, B Lab, a nonprofit organization, began certifying
companies as “Certified B Corporations.” 19 Eventually, B Lab also
14. B Corp Community: Patagonia Inc., B LAB CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://
bcorporation.net/community/directory/patagonia (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
15. America’s Best Leaders 2009, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT http://www.usnews.com/
listings/best-leaders/4-yvon-chouinard (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
16. See infra Parts V and VI.
17. Profit-focused acquirers could, however, see benefit corporations as attractive targets
because of the social goodwill the benefit corporation has created. Alicia Plerhoples, Can an

Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social
Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 235 (2012). In addition, some
profit-focused acquirers could see benefit corporations as poorly managed and envision
opportunities to cut the social and environmental programs, increase profits, and subsequently
sell for a quick profit. Parts III, IV, and V discuss the legal hurdles that a profit-focused
acquirer would have to clear under the current law and additional amendments to the benefit
corporation statutes that should be considered.
18. See infra Parts V and VI.
19. Murray, supra note 7 (discussing the differences between Certified B Corporations and
benefit corporations).
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started lobbying states to pass benefit corporation statutes, and in
2010 Maryland became the first state to pass such a statute. 20 Since
then, 11 other states have passed similar benefit corporation
statutes. 21 A number of the states have passed the legislation
unanimously, 22 but a few states have rejected or stalled the bills. 23 As
of the date of publication of this article, there is no known litigation
involving benefit corporation governance. Currently, there are
approximately 700 Certified B Corporations and approximately 200
entities formed as benefit corporations. 24
According to their proponents, the benefit corporation statutes
combat the shareholder wealth maximization norm that they claim is
mandated by traditional corporate law. 25 In practice, except in a
small handful of cases—Dodge v. Ford, 26 Revlon, 27 and eBay v.
Newmark28—courts very rarely enforce shareholder wealth
maximization. 29 Among the exceptions, however, the takeover cases
play a prominent role. 30

20. Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSR WIRE
(Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Unionto-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.
21. Benefit Corp. State by State Legislation, CERTIFIED BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
22. See PA Leads B Corporations Push, But Will It Become Official?, KEYSTONE EDGE
(May 3, 2012), http://www.keystoneedge.com/features/bcorporations0503.aspx (noting the nine
unanimous floor votes for benefit corporations as of May 2012).
23. To date, at least Michigan, North Carolina, and Colorado have provided some
resistance to passing the model benefit corporation legislation.
24. CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net. The number of benefit
corporations is difficult to determine with accuracy, as many secretaries of states do not
separate benefit corporations from traditional corporations, but the estimate of 200 benefit
corporations is made based on the author’s efforts calling secretaries of states, and consultation
with B Lab personnel. An incomplete list of benefit corporations can be found at the following
website: http://www.benefitcorp.net/find-a-benefit-corp/search. See also Eric Talley, Corporate
Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from California (and Beyond) 7 (UC
Berkeley Pub. L. Research, Working Paper No. 2144567, Sept. 10, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567 (reporting that 60 benefit
corporations had been formed in California by mid-August 2012. Professor Talley also
mentions that this number of benefit corporations is massively dwarfed by the roughly 60,000
new incorporations occurred overall during the same period of time in California.”).
25. See Murray, supra note 7 (detailing the debate over the shareholder wealth
maximization norm).
26. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
27. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
28. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
29. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 288 (1998)
(noting that “[a]lthough it is possible for shareholders to prevail on claims that the board of
directors violated the shareholder primacy norm, such cases are extremely rare”).
30. See infra Part III.
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III. TAKEOVER DEFENSES, UNOCAL, AND EBAY
A. TWO-PRONGED UNOCAL TEST
A seminal case in the takeover defense area is the Delaware
Supreme Court case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 31 In
analyzing the use of a self-tender offer as a takeover defense, Unocal
applied what “has been called an ‘intermediate’ or ‘enhanced
business judgment’ standard of review, but is perhaps best described
as a ‘conditional business judgment rule.’” 32 The Unocal court stated,
“[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and
its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination before the protections of the business judgment rule may
be conferred.” 33 Under the first prong of the two-pronged Unocal
test, the directors of the company enacting the takeover defense bear
the burden of showing a “danger to corporate policy or
effectiveness.” 34 Under the second prong, the directors must also
prove that the takeover defense was “reasonable in relation to the
threat posed.” 35 If the directors satisfy both prongs of the Unocal test
then the business judgment rule applies. But if the directors fail to
carry their burden on either prong then the intrinsic fairness test
applies. 36 While the two-prong test is merely the first part of the
inquiry to determine which standard applies, the answer to the initial
inquiry is usually outcome determinative. 37 Ten years after Unocal,
the Unitrin court added that “if the board of directors’ defensive
31. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge I];
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J.

CORP. L. 491 (2001).
32. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 254 (3d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE (M&A)].
33. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
34. Id. at 955. Directors may carry their burden under the first prong by “showing good
faith and reasonable investigation.” Id. The director’s proof is “materially enhanced” if the
board is “comprised of a majority of outside directors.” Id.
35. Id. at 955–56. Under the second prong, which is an element of balance, the court will
analyze the “nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise.” Id. at 955.
The court listed the following as potential concerns: “inadequacy of the price offered, nature
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally),
the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.” Id.
36. Id. at 9585; R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.20 (3d. ed. 1997 & Supp. 2012).
37. BAINBRIDGE (M&A), supra note 32, at 257.
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response is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a
‘range of reasonableness,’ a court must not substitute its judgment for
the board’s.” 38
Academic commentators have noted that, while the Unocal test
may be called an “enhanced” or “intermediate” standard of review,
the test is seldom used to hold directors accountable. 39 Unocal
expressly allows consideration of “constituencies other than
shareholders” and stated that “perhaps” the community in general
could even be considered. 40
Of the 12 states that have passed benefit corporation statutes,
one has cited Unocal approvingly, three have expressly rejected
Unocal, and eight have not yet cited Unocal either positively or
negatively in cases involving their state’s law. 41 The states that have
rejected or not yet addressed Unocal appear to mostly use the
business judgment rule in takeover defense situations, giving directors
even more protection than Unocal’s conditional business judgment
rule. 42

B. EBAY AND TRADITIONAL FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
The eBay v. Newmark 43 case arose out of disagreements between
eBay and the two founders of Craigslist (Craig Newmark and James
As of August 10, 2004, craigslist had three
Buckmaster). 44
shareholders: Newmark owned 42.6 percent, Buckmaster owned 29
percent, and eBay owned 28.4 percent. 45 EBay expressed interest in
taking over craigslist, allegedly misused Craigslist’s confidential
information to launch a competing website, and disagreed with the
founders on numerous operational issues. 46 Not interested in selling
craigslist and wishing to “gracefully unwind the relationship” with
eBay, the founders of Craigslist took three primary actions that led to
38. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995).
39. See, e.g., Bainbridge I, supra note 31, at 772 (citing academics who have criticized
Unocal as a “toothless standard”). In contrast, Unocal has also been called “the most
innovative and promising in [Delaware’s] recent corporation law.” City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1989).
40. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
41. See infra Appendix A.
42. Id.
43. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
44. Id. at 6; see generally David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise
System: A Comment on eBay v. Newmark, Comment, 121 YALE L.J. 2405 (2012).
45. eBay, 16 A.3d at 11.
46. Id. at 15–20.
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the litigation: “(1) implementation of a staggered board through
amendments to the craigslist charter and bylaws (the “Staggered
Board Amendments”); (2) approval of a stockholder rights plan (the
“Rights Plan”); and (3) an offer to issue one new share of craigslist
stock in exchange for every five shares on which a craigslist
stockholder granted a right of first refusal in favor of craigslist (the
“ROFR/Dilutive Issuance”).” 47 The Chancellor applied the Unocal
standard to the Rights Plan and rescinded the entire plan. 48
The eBay v. Newmark case has been used aggressively by
proponents of the benefit corporation statutes. For example, B Lab
co founder Jay Coen Gilbert stated, according to eBay, “the only
game in town, if you are a U.S. corporation, is to maximize
shareholder value. That makes it awfully hard to care about what
you’re doing with your employees or what you’re doing with your
community or what you are doing with the environment when that is
the law of the land and if you don’t do that you can get sued.” 49
Furthermore, the Benefit Corporation White Paper, authored by a
number of attorneys who are promoting the form, states that “[i]n
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, the Delaware Court of
Chancery recently reaffirmed its position that corporate directors are
obligated pursuant to their fiduciary duties to maximize shareholder
value.” 50 A fair reading of Delaware law, however, shows much more
deference to directorial decisionmaking than either of these
statements suggest, but Chancellor Leo Strine added fuel to the fire
with his 2012 Wake Forest Law Review article titled Our Continuing

47. eBay, 16 A.3d at 19–21.
48. Id. at 28–35. The eBay v. Newmark case, which amounted to a rare loss for directors,
could have breathed a bit of life into what has been called a dead or dying Unocal case. Robert
B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred
Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 286–94 (2001) (describing Unocal as a
“dead letter” and stating that directors virtually always win under the Unocal standard)
However, the ebay court mentioned that this appeared to be the first case of an extremely
closely held corporation utilizing a Rights Plan and noted that the craigslist stockholders were
not “dispersed, disempowered, or vulnerable stockholders” that Rights Plans were usually used
to protect. eBay, 15 A.3d at 30–31. As such, eBay’s impact may be limited.
49. Jay Coen Gilbert, TedX xPhilly – Jay Coen Gilbert – On Better Business, YOUTUBE,
at 9:40–10:02 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU.
50. William H. Clark & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit

Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs,
Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 11 (Benefits Corp. White Paper, 2012), available at
http://www.benefitcorp.
_April_2012.pdf.

net/storage/The_Need_and_Rationale_for_Benefit_Corporations_-
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Struggle With The Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit. 51

In that article, Chancellor Strine argued “that the corporate law
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a
good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders,” but he
also clarified that he did “not mean to imply that the corporate law
requires directors to maximize short-term profits for stockholders.” 52
While the outcome in eBay v. Newmark may be rare, its impact
could be quite significant. For example, while the 1919 Dodge v.
Ford case, which overrode Henry Ford’s decision not to pay special
dividends in a purported attempt to benefit society with the funds,
was admittedly “atavistic,” it has impacted corporate law practice for
almost an entire century by pushing risk-averse business people
toward more emphasis on shareholder wealth. 53 Norms and practices
that spring from cases like Dodge v. Ford can reach much further
than the actual holding of the case or any precedential power the case
may possess. 54 The eBay case has the potential for a large impact
similar to Dodge v. Ford, especially in the takeover defense arena,
even if some academics feel that eBay was wrongly decided or should
be limited to minority oppression fact patterns. 55 While the Unocal
standard is generally toothless, the eBay case will likely work itself
into corporate lore and could push risk adverse social entrepreneurs,
especially those using the Delaware for-profit corporate form, in the
direction of shareholder wealth maximization.
The benefit corporation legislation alleviates fears of the eBay
situation repeating itself by explicitly stating that the purpose of a
benefit corporation is not shareholder wealth maximization but rather

51. Leo E. Strine, Jr. Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012). One can read Chancellor Strine’s article as
arguing for an extension of eBay beyond the takeover defense area.
52. Leo E. Strine, Jr., supra note 51, at 155 (emphasis added).
53. William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a
Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS.

LAW. 1383, 1385 n.7 (2005).
54. See generally Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 519 (2012). While eBay is a lower court decision, it comes from the
highly influential Delaware Court of Chancery. Dodge v. Ford, on the other hand, was a case
from Michigan, a state that has comparatively little influence on the course of corporate law.
55. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Beyond the Inevitable and Inadequate Regulation of
Bankers: A Comment on Painter, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 29, 37 n.29 (2010) (noting problems
with the eBay decision); see also e-mail from Professor Lynn Stout (March 25, 2013 12:31 EST)
(confirming her view that eBay is merely an oppression case). Cf. D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 323 (1998) (noting that the shareholder primacy
norm “first appeared in cases involving closely held corporations, which today would be treated
under the doctrine of minority oppression”).
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a “general public benefit.” 56 The Unocal test could still be used in
evaluating a benefit corporation’s takeover defense, but the threats
and the reasonableness of the response would be evaluated in light of
the purpose of the benefit corporation. The stated purpose of the
benefit corporation would also prevent courts from concluding, as
Chancellor Chandler did in eBay, that “[p]romoting, protecting, or
pursuing nonstockholder considerations must lead at some point to
value for stockholders.” 57
Takeover defenses erected by directors of a benefit corporation
to protect the entity from those focusing on short-term profits, and
from rulings like those in eBay v. Newmark, should be allowed, but
the takeover defenses should still have to be reasonably related to the
mission of the entity. The current benefit corporation statutes do not
require managers to prioritize among the stakeholders, but this
author has suggested that the statutes should at least require benefit
corporations to choose their top priority to guide courts, directors,
and investors. 58 Once the top priority is chosen, the courts could
more easily use the Unocal test to determine whether the takeover
defense was a reasonable protection of the entity’s mission and its
priorities. Benefit corporation directors would be able to protect the
company’s mission, without fear of ruling like the one in eBay v.
Newmark, but the clear statement of the entity’s top priority would
allow courts to effectively use the Unocal test to attack unreasonable
takeover defenses that were erected only to entrench the directors
and not to protect the entity’s mission. 59
56. See Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 102(a), 201(a) (defining “general public
benefit” as “[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole,
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation.”), available at www.benefitcorp.net/storage/Model_Legislation.pdf (making the
creation of “general public benefit”, defined as “[a] material positive impact on society and the
environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation.”). Most of the state benefit corporation statutes closely
follow the model legislation. See J. Haskell Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute
Comparison Chart (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1988556.
57. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d at 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).
58. Murray, supra note 7 (proposing that benefit corporation statutes require benefit
corporations to state the stakeholder of primary importance in the corporation’s governing
documents).
59. The “general public benefit purpose” required in the benefit corporation statutes would
likely allow directors of benefit corporations to erect draconian takeover defenses and hide
behind the vague, unprioritized language to completely entrench themselves. See Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (stating that the “omnipresent specter” of
self-interest and the directors’ natural desire to entrench themselves in their positions leads to
the need for an enhanced duty and additional judicial scrutiny).
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IV. EXPLORING REVLON-LAND
A. REVLON BACKGROUND

Revlon is one of the most cited and most controversial cases in
corporate law. 60 In that case, Revlon faced a hostile takeover bid
from Ronald Pearlman’s Pantry Pride, Inc. (“Pantry Pride”) and used
defensive measures to favor its “white knight” Forstmann Little &
Co. and its affiliates (collectively, “Forstmann”). 61 The court found
that Revlon ended the auction, involving Pearlman and Forstmann,
prematurely by granting Forstmann an option to buy certain valuable
Revlon assets at a discount (the “lock-up option”), a no-shop
provision, and a $25 million cancellation fee. 62 The Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision to
enjoin the defensive measures. 63
Revlon claimed that one of the reasons it accepted Forstmann’s
offer was because his offer was better for constituencies other than
The court rejected that
stockholders, including noteholders. 64
argument, stating “while concern for various corporate constituencies
is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited
by the requirement that there be some rationally related benefit
accruing to the stockholders.” 65 The court further explained “[a]
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for nonstockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or
maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest
bidder.” 66
Under Revlon, when:
it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was
inevitable . . . . The duty of the board had thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of
60. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 36, § 4.20.
61. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175–76 (Del. 1986).
62. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175–76.
63. Id. at 185.
64. Id. at 179. The court explained that the noteholders’ interests were protected by
contract. Id. 182–83.
65. Id. at 176.
66. Id. at 182 (citation omitted).
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the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit. This
significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the Unocal
standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and
effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests, from a grossly
inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became
moot. The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate

bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company. 67

As evidenced by these quotes, once a company enters Revlon-land, it
must intensify focus on shareholder wealth.
B. TIME AND QVC
This section will address two major cases following Revlon:
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. (“Time”) 68 and
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (“QVC”).69
Like Revlon, these opinions are by no means recent, but they all still

hold prominent places in the mergers and acquisitions case law. 70
Time is a case that many may think supports social
entrepreneurs. In Time, the court found that Revlon was not
triggered when the corporation was merely “in play” or “up for
sale.” 71 Rather, Revlon is triggered in at least two situations: when
(1) “a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up
of the company” or (2) “in response to a bidder’s offer, a target
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
involving the breakup of the company.” 72 Though Revlon did not
apply in Time, Unocal did. 73 Applying the Unocal test, the Time
court reaffirmed director primacy and deferred to Time’s board of
directors’ decision to take an offer from Warner Communication, Inc.
67. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
68. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
69. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). Professor Bainbridge provides a detailed map of Revlon-land
and its progeny. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2115769 [hereinafter Bainbridge II].
70. Bainbridge II, supra note 69, at 24.
71. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989).
72. Id. at 1150. The court left open the possibility that other actions, outside of the two
listed, might trigger Revlon. Id. The QVC court reiterated the disjunctive nature of this quote
and the fact that the Time court intentionally included the phrase “without excluding other
possibilities” when discussing the instances where Revlon applied. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46–48.
73. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150–51.

MURRAY (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2013

3/31/2013 11:30 PM

DEFENDING PATAGONIA

497

that was much lower, on its face, than a competing offer from
Paramount. 74 The Time board claimed it rejected Paramount’s offer
because it was “inadequate” and because “the Warner transaction
offered a greater long-term value for the stockholders and, unlike
Paramount’s offer, did not pose a threat to Time’s survival and its
‘culture.’” 75 In eBay, however, Chancellor Chandler clarified that
Time 76 “did not hold that corporate culture, standing alone, is worthy
of protection as an end in itself.” 77
Approximately five years later, in QVC, Paramount found itself
on the other side of the argument, and tried to use much of the same
reasoning that had beaten them in Time. 78 Paramount favored
Viacom over QVC and agreed to a number of significant dealprotection measures. 79 The court reiterated director primacy, but
stated that enhanced scrutiny was appropriate in the QVC case
because: “(1) the approval of a transaction resulting in a sale of
control, and (2) the adoption of defensive measures in response to a
threat to corporate control.” 80 The Delaware Supreme Court focused
on impact of the change of control in QVC to distinguish it from
Time. 81 The court noted that:
[o]nce control has shifted, the current Paramount stockholders will
have no leverage in the future to demand another control premium.
As a result, the Paramount stockholders are entitled to receive, and
should receive, a control premium and/or protective devices of
significant value. There being no such protective provisions in the
Viacom–Paramount transaction, the Paramount directors had an
obligation to take the maximum advantage of the current

74. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at at 1148–53.
75. Id. at 1149.
76. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
77. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010). The court
stated that the possibility of eBay departing from craigslist’s “public-service mission in favor of
increased monetization of craigslist” upon the death of the Craigslist founders was not a valid
reason for adopting the Rights Plan. Id. at 32.
78. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994).
79. Id. at 37–41.
80. Id. at 42; see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge III].
81. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42–43. “Following such consummation, there will be a controlling
stockholder who will have the voting power to: (a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-up of the
corporation; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cash-out the public stockholders; (e) amend
the certificate of incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g)
otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public stockholders’ interests.
Irrespective of the present Paramount Board’s vision of a long-term strategic alliance with
Viacom, the proposed sale of control would provide the new controlling stockholder with the
power to alter that vision.” Id. at 43.
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opportunity to realize for the stockholders the best value
82
reasonably available.

The court reiterated that “[i]n the sale of control context, the
directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the
stockholders—and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further
that end.” 83 While the QVC court stated “there is ‘no single
blueprint’ directors must follow” in the sale process, the court did
mention that directors must be diligent and act in good faith. 84 After
noting the complexity of the board’s task, the court reminded the
reader that “a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a
perfect decision.” 85
The QVC court distinguished Time by stating, “[i]n [Time], the
Chancellor held that there was no change of control in the original
stock-for-stock merger between Time and Warner because Time
would be owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders
both before and after the merger.” 86 While Time might have given
Patagonia some hope, Revlon, QVC, and eBay show that directors of
traditional Delaware corporations still need to focus on shareholder
value.

V. PRE-EXISTING SOLUTIONS FOR DEFENDING
PATAGONIA
How could Yvon Chouinard defend Patagonia’s environmental
mission in the face of holdings in Unocal, Revlon, and eBay, which
place the focus on shareholder value? There are a number of viable

82. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 43–44, 48. In a sale of control, directors can focus on things other than cash
offered in the deal, such as “fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for the
offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions of illegality; . . . the risk of nonconsum[m]ation; . . . the bidder’s identity, prior background and other business venture
experiences; and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder
interests.” Id. at 44.
85. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis in original). When enhanced scrutiny applies “[t]he
directors have the burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted reasonably.
Id.
86. Id. at 46.
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solutions, including those discussed in this Part below, that pre date
the benefit corporation.
A. CHARTER PROVISIONS
Opponents of the benefit corporation statutes argue that the
statutes are unnecessary because corporations can already be
organized to serve social and environmental purposes. For example,
the Delaware General Corporation Law states that the certificate of
incorporation may set forth
[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of
the stockholders, or the governing body, members, or any class
or group of members of a nonstock corporation; if such
87
provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State.

Whether a social and environmental purpose clause would
violate the law of Delaware may be open to debate, though the better
argument seems to be that such a clause would be allowed, at least if
included in the initial charter. 88 Oregon’s corporate law makes the
ability to adopt such a purpose clause more explicit, stating that the
articles of incorporation may include “[a] provision authorizing or
directing the corporation to conduct the business of the corporation
in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.” 89 This
Oregon provision implies, but does not expressly state, that
environmentally and socially responsible management can be
detrimental to shareholder wealth. 90
The benefit corporation solution could be better for the social
entrepreneur than the charter provision solution for three primary
reasons. First, in six of the twelve states that have passed benefit
corporation legislation, charter provisions of traditional corporations
can be changed by an affirmative vote of a mere majority of
shareholders. 91 In contrast, the benefit corporation statutes generally
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2012).
88. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). If
the initial charter contained terms explaining the social or environmental focus of the
corporation, investors would be put on notice and would have difficulty explaining their
objection at a later date.
89. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (2010).
90. Id.
91. See infra Appendix B.
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require approval by two-thirds of shareholders to adopt or terminate
benefit corporation status, which gives social entrepreneurs more
confidence that the mission of their company would not be easily
discarded. 92 Second, as discussed below, the benefit corporation
moniker is a more visible signal to the market than a provision in the
charter that many investors may never read. 93 Third, the California
benefit corporation statute provides for dissenters’ rights if a
corporation changes to or from a benefit corporation. 94 The
traditional corporate law in California, however, does not provide for
dissenters’ rights for amending the corporate charter, so the purpose
clause solution would be less effective at maintaining the corporate
purpose than the benefit corporation statute.
The current benefit corporation statutes are not perfect,
however. The dissenters’ rights and super majority vote are only
required if the corporation decides to adopt or terminate benefit
corporation status. 95 The dissenters’ rights and super majority vote
are not expressly triggered by the statute if a benefit corporation
changes its specific public benefit purpose or how it chooses to
prioritize among stakeholders, giving the company freedom to stray
significantly from its original purpose. 96 The dissenters’ rights and
super majority vote will better protect the mission of the benefit
corporation if these protection measures are coupled with the
statutory amendment suggested in a previous article by this author:
requiring each benefit corporation to choose a specific public benefit

92. See Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute Comparison Chart, supra note 56
(summarizing the provisions of the various benefit corporation statutes); see also Appendix B.
93. See infra Part VI.A (describing benefit corporation signaling).
94. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14603–14604 (West 2012). In Choose Your Own Master: Social
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, the author argued for the
expansion of dissenters’ rights to other states with benefit corporation statutes as a change in
corporate purpose can be just as fundamental a change as a merger. Murray, supra note 7.
Benefit corporation proponents argue that dissenters’ rights are not included in the model
benefit corporation legislation because changing corporate form is not a liquidation event.
Clark & Vranka, supra note 50, at 26–27. If, however, the change is a good one, the corporation
should be able to find capital to replace the dissenters.
95. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 104–105.
96. See generally Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute Comparison Chart, supra
note 56. The general corporate code of the given state applies to benefit corporations, except
where the benefit corporation statute conflicts with the general corporate code. Model Benefit
Corp. Legislation § 101(c). Given that some general corporate codes require approval by a
super majority of shareholders to amend the corporation’s articles, benefit corporations in those
states will be required to do so.
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or specific stakeholder group as its top priority. 97 If the identification
of the benefit corporation’s top priority is required, the benefit
corporation statute could then require both a super majority vote and
dissenters’ rights upon a change of that priority. These amendments
would give the benefit corporation statute more teeth, help lessen
investors’ fear about mission-drift, provide directors with more
guidance, and help elevate the benefit corporation solution over the
charter amendment solution.
B. VOTING CONTROL
Individuals in a number of companies, such as Facebook, 98
Google, 99 and the New York Times, 100 have retained substantial
control by entering into voting agreements or voting trusts, or by
creating and holding high-vote stock. This voting control may allow
these individuals to pursue social and environmental causes. More
germane to this article, voting control may allow these individuals to
ward off hostile takeovers that threaten to end the social and
environmental mission of their companies. While shareholders may
generally vote in their own self-interest, dominant shareholders may
have to worry about oppression lawsuits. 101 Dodge v. Ford has been
characterized as an oppression lawsuit, and in Dodge the minority
shareholders were at least partially successful. 102 Also, at some point
97. Murray, supra note 7. The general public benefit purpose could still be statutorily
required, but also requiring a prioritized specific public benefit purpose would provide
additional guidance for directors
98. James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2012, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki (noting that
Facebook Chief Executive Officer and co-founder, Mark Zuckerberg, owns 18 percent of the
company, but controls 57 percent of the shares).
99. See Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-givesgoogle-founders-tighter-control/ (stating that Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page will
control Google’s super-voting class B common shares); see also Certificate of Incorporation of
Google Inc. (last visited Jan. 30, 2013), Art. IV, § 2(a)(ii), available at
http://investor.google.com/pdf/google-fourth-amended-and-restated-certificate-ofincorporation.pdf (showing class B stock has 10 votes for every one vote of class A stock.
100. Joe Nocera, How Punch Protected the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/opinion/nocera-how-punch-protected-the-times.html?_r=0
(stating that the “Class B shares, held largely in a family trust, still gave the Sulzbergers the
power to elect around 70 percent of the board.”).
101. See generally F. Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting
Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121 (1986–1987).
102. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 323 (1998)
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the voting control will pass to a younger generation who may have a
different vision for the company, and who may wreck the legacy of
the corporation’s founders.
The current benefit corporation statutes partially address this
inadequacy of the voting control method in preserving the company’s
mission.
The benefit corporation statutes require benefit
corporations to pursue a “general public benefit purpose,” but the
statues do not require prioritization of any specific constituent. 103 If a
primary constituent is not required, a younger generation could shift
the corporation’s focus (from the environment to employees, for
example) without much fear of legally imposed consequences. In a
previous article, this author addressed this issue by suggesting the
statute require the appointment of a primary constituent while still
requiring the consideration of the “general public benefit.” 104 While
an oppression lawsuit might still be possible in the benefit corporation
context, having the priorities and mission of the benefit corporation
clearly stated would make a successful oppression lawsuit, when the
directors were following that stated mission, much less likely. Some
may argue that corporations should not be strangled by a founder’s
dead hand, but the benefit corporation statutes do not completely
restrain future generations. 105 The statutes, instead, allow termination
of benefit corporation status upon a super majority shareholder vote.
If the benefit corporation statutes were amended as suggested in this
article, the statutes would also allow a change of the benefit
corporation’s primary constituent or specific mission upon a super
majority shareholder vote. 106

(discussing cases including Dodge v. Ford, Professor Smith concludes that “[c]onflicts among
shareholders have long been analyzed under the doctrine of minority oppression rather than the
shareholder primacy norm. Despite the link between the modern doctrine of minority
oppression and the shareholder primacy norm, the shareholder primacy norm is broader than
necessary to resolve problems of minority oppression in closely held corporations.”).
103. See Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 102(a), 201(a).
104. Murray, supra note 7.
105. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating a deadhand poison pill).
106. Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute Comparison Chart, supra note 56 (showing
that most benefit corporation statutes require a two-thirds shareholder vote to adopt or
terminate benefit corporation status).
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C. AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES
Various defensive measures could be utilized to defend
Patagonia from an unwanted takeover, even if it were not a benefit
corporation. One of the most powerful defensive measures is the
combination of the poison pill and the classified board. 107 Recently,
in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. AirGas, Inc., 108 the Delaware
Court of Chancery held this combination to be valid under the facts
of that case. 109 The decision did not appear to be an easy one,
however, and the court said that the AirGas case should not be read
to allow the board to “just say never” to takeovers. 110 The court
examined scholarship and case law on the issue before ultimately
recognizing Delaware law’s “long-understood respect for reasonably
exercised managerial discretion, so long as boards are found to be
acting in good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary duties
(after rigorous judicial fact-finding and enhanced scrutiny of their
defensive actions).” 111
In Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of A
Social Enterprise Icon, Professors Antony Page and Robert Katz
explain the various defensive measures Ben & Jerry’s could have used
to protect itself from a hostile takeover, including a poison pill
coupled with a staggered board. 112
Various takeover defenses, including and especially the poison
pill coupled with the staggered board, may provide significant
protection to a traditional corporation that is pursuing social and
environmental ends. However, there is increasing pressure from
institutional investors to declassify boards and redeem poison pills. 113
107. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 887 (2002).
108. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); see generally
Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial
Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502 (2012).
109. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 16 A.3d at 129.
110. Id.; see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills,
and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511
(1997).
111. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 16 A.3d at 129.
112. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the
Sale of A Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 233–34 (2010).
113. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Thirty-Six Precatory Declassification Proposals Going
to a Vote at Annual Meetings, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/
2012/04/10/thirty-six-precatory-declassification-proposals-going-to-a-vote-at-annual-
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The benefit corporation solves that problem by signaling that it is
interested in a different type of investor—an investor focused on
multiple bottom lines. The benefit corporation investor will be less
likely to pressure for the removal of these takeover defenses because
she has been attracted to the benefit corporation, at least in part,
because of its mission. How many of these socially motivated
investors exist and how much they are willing to invest in these social
enterprise forms, like benefit corporations, remains to be seen. 114
D. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
Approximately 30 states have some form of constituency
statute. 115 Constituency statutes, however, do not seem to have been
very effective in combating the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. 116 Perhaps this lack of effectiveness stems from the fact that
the typical constituency statute is permissive and does not give nonshareholder stakeholders standing to sue. 117 While constituency
statutes undoubtedly provide some protection for directors seeking to
further the social or environmental mission of the corporation, the
constituency statutes do not seem to motivate the average director to
move beyond the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Of the 12
states that have passed benefit corporation statutes, nine states
already had some form of constituency statute. 118 The benefit
corporation statute does more than the typical constituency statute.
First, the benefit corporation statute is mandatory, not permissive. 119
Second, the benefit corporation statute expressly provides the option

meetings; John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the
Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 703, 736 (1999) (noting that
“shareholder proposals seeking to redeem or require a shareholder vote on rights plans [also
known as “poison pills”] have been a favorite area for institutional investors.”).
114. If these socially motivated investors do exist in significant numbers, the next question is
whether they will remain socially motivated throughout the life of the company.
115. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2009).
116. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes
and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 108 (1999) (arguing that constituency statutes have
not lived up to the hopes of their proponents).
117. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency
Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1121 (2000) (arguing that “stakeholders need to be given
standing to sue; otherwise, constituency statutes lack the power necessary to guarantee
consideration of nonshareholder interests”).
118. See infra Appendix A.
119. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a).
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to give standing to non-shareholder stakeholders. 120 While few, if
any, benefit corporations may take advantage of non-shareholder
standing option, the shareholders in a benefit corporation should do a
better job enforcing the mission than shareholders in a traditional
corporation because the benefit corporation shareholders bought
shares after being put on notice that the entity was a benefit
corporation with a mission other than just maximizing shareholder
value.

VI. BENEFIT CORPORATION SOLUTIONS
The solutions discussed above may be sufficient in most cases to
defend Patagonia, but the solutions have their mentioned flaws and
limitations. Benefit corporation statutes provide the improvements
discussed below, and could be made even more beneficial by adopting
the statutory amendments suggested in this Part.
A. FOLLOWING THE FLAG: SIGNALING SOCIAL FOCUS
There is an instinct in the human race which delights in the flying of
flags—a sentiment which appears to be inborn, causing men to
become enthusiastic about a significant emblem raised in the air,
whether as the insignia of descent, or as a symbol of race, or of
nationality; something which, being held aloft before the sight of
other men, declares, at a glance, the side to which the bearer
belongs, and serves as a rallying point for those who think with
121
him.

In early warfare, warriors rallied around and were led by flags. 122
Flags guided, united, and signified a common cause. 123 The benefit
corporation label could serve as a metaphorical flag, a signaling
device, for those interested in societal and environmental good. As
the benefit corporation form becomes more widely recognized, and if
it becomes recognized as more than mere greenwashing, likeminded
120. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 305(a).
121. BARLOW CUMBERLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE UNION JACK AND FLAGS OF THE
EMPIRE 13 (3d ed. 1909).
122. WILLIAM FOSTER-HARRIS, THE LOOK OF THE OLD WEST: A FULLY ILLUSTRATED
GUIDE 91 (2007).
123. CUMBERLAND, supra note 121, at 13; 2 GROUND WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (Stanley Sandler ed., 2002).
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directors and investors may flock to the form. 124 In an era of rampant
greenwashing, having the form grounded in state statute is an
advantage, even though the current statutes themselves are far from
perfect. Attracting directors and investors who believe in the
corporation’s mission may serve as a powerful defense against hostile
corporate raiders who desire to focus more strictly on short-term
profits.
The current benefit corporation statutes, however, do not
provide a clear rallying point and currently appear unworkable in the
mergers and acquisition context. The current benefit corporation
statutes require the corporation to pursue a general public benefit
purpose. 125 In pursuing that purpose, most state benefit corporation
statutes require directors to consider at least seven different
stakeholder groups, but do not require prioritization among those
groups. 126 Under the current statutes, shareholders aligned with any
one of those shareholder groups could bring a benefit enforcement
proceeding to enjoin a merger. 127 Under the current statutes,
directors are provided no clear direction and no helpful guidelines for
how to choose among offers to purchase the benefit corporation.
Amending benefit corporation statutes to require the
identification of at least the company’s top priority (its primary
specific public benefit) would lead to a better defined mission and cut
against confusion among the corporate stakeholders. 128 Requiring
choice of at least a top priority would make it possible to create a
sensible framework for directorial decisionmaking in the mergers and
acquisitions context—providing guidance to directors, aligning
investor expectations, and containing the appropriate amount of
potential liability. The next section explains how, with a few
amendments to the statutes, benefit corporations can navigate in the
mergers and acquisitions context.

124. While discussion of game theory, signaling, and focal points is beyond the scope of this
article, future articles may explore benefit corporations’ place in those areas. See, e.g., HOWELL
E. JACKSON, ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS, 33–34, 44–47 (2d. ed. 2011).
125. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 201(a).
126. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a).
127. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 301(a), 305.
128. Murray, supra note 7.
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B. MISSION STICKINESS: REDUCING MISSION-DRIFT
[Y]ou will come to the Sirens who enchant all who come near
them . . . stop your men’s ears with wax that none of them may
hear; but if you like you can listen yourself, for you get the men
to bind
you as you stand upright on a cross-piece halfway up the
129
mast.

Mission-drift, or mission creep, is a frequently discussed topic in
social enterprise circles. 130 Organizations often drift from their
intended purpose much the same way individuals drift from their
personal goals. The drafters of the benefit corporation statutes might
be able to learn from the Yale economics, management, and law
professors who created a website, stickK.com, where individuals can
“sign contracts obliging them to achieve their personal goals”
(Commitment Contracts). 131 StickK.com is “based on two wellknown principles of behavioral economics: (1) People don’t always do
what they claim they want to do, and (2) incentives get people to do
things.” 132 StickK.com allows individuals to precommit to actions
they want to do, but that may be difficult to accomplish day-to-day. 133
Similarly, benefit corporation statutes attempt to allow managers and
investors to pre-commit to a positive mission, which may be difficult
to achieve once the Sirens’ call of short-term profit is heard. Benefit
corporation statutes attempt to reduce mission-drift and create some
“mission stickiness.” 134 This mission stickiness is currently created in
two ways: the super majority vote and the benefit enforcement
proceeding. 135 Mission stickiness could be improved, however, by
amending current benefit corporation statutes and giving the statutes
some teeth by requiring a floor for corporate charitable giving and a
129. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOK XII, 148 (Samuel Butler trans., 1944).
130. See, e.g., Alicia Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 221, 257–59 (2012) (discussing the problem of mission-drift or “sell-out” in the flexible
purpose corporation context); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 805–807 (2011); (recognizing “philanthrocapitalism” as a cause of
mission-drift); Christine Hurt, Family Christian Bookstores -- Private Equity, Mission Drift and
the Religious Corporation, THE CONGLOMERATE, (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate
.org/2012/11/family-christian-bookstores-private-equity-mission-drift-and-the-religiouscorporation.html.
131. STICKK, http://www.stickk.com/about.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. “Mission stickiness” is a term created for this article. A statute that creates mission
stickiness will reduce the amount and/or probability of mission drift by the entities subject to the
statute.
135. See infra Part VI.B.1–2.
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partial asset lock. With these two amendments, governments could
be more confident that the benefit corporations are actually doing at
least some good, and then the governments could be more at ease if
and when they provide incentives to benefit corporations.

1. Super Majority Vote and Dissenters’ Rights
Most benefit corporation statutes require an affirmative vote of
at least two-thirds of the shareholders to adopt or terminate benefit
corporation status. 136 This super majority vote creates a higher hurdle
in those states that do not already require super majority voting for
merger approval. 137 The super majority vote hurdle is not impossible,
however, and a determined acquirer could potentially convince twothirds of the shareholders to agree to the termination of the target’s
benefit corporation status. For the shareholders who vote against the
adoption or termination of the benefit corporation statute,
California’s statute explicitly provides dissenters’ rights to
shareholders who will receive “fair value” for their shares. 138 The
traditional corporate statutes of many states, including Delaware,
already provide for dissenters’ (or “appraisal”) rights under certain
circumstances in the mergers and acquisitions context, so the
provision of dissenters’ rights is certainly not unprecedented. 139

2. Benefit Enforcement Proceeding
The benefit enforcement proceeding created by the benefit
corporation statutes provides a way for a shareholder to potentially
prevent a transaction that strays from the benefit corporation’s
mission. 140 The benefit enforcement proceeding does not provide a
right to monetary damages, but does provide grounds for a possible

136. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 104–105; Murray, Benefit Corporations: State

Statute Comparison Chart, supra note 56.

137. Appendix B (showing that the traditional corporation statutes in half of the states
where a benefit corporation statute has passed require approval by a majority of shareholders,
while half of the states require approval by at least two-thirds of shareholders).
138. Oddly, Massachusetts’ benefit corporation statute gives appraisal rights to dissenting
shareholders when a traditional corporation becomes a benefit corporation, but does not
expressly provide appraisal rights when a benefit corporation becomes a traditional corporation.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 5, 8 (West 2012).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2012); see generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael
L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 (2005).
140. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 305; Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute
Comparison Chart, supra note 56.
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injunction. 141 Problematically, the statute does not provide any
guidance on the relative weighting among stakeholders, which means
that any shareholder with affinity to any of the many listed
stakeholder groups would potentially be able to enjoin a transaction.
Also, the benefit corporation statutes allow, but do not automatically
provide, standing for non-shareholder stakeholders. 142 While most
companies will probably not rush to give others standing to sue them,
some benefit corporations may wish to give standing to one or more
key stakeholder groups. Such a grant may be evidence of the
company’s long-term commitment to their mission. This author is
not, however, in favor of the statute providing automatic standing to
non-shareholder stakeholders. Given the variety among benefit
corporations, it would be difficult to impossible to choose, via statute,
the proper individuals or groups, other than shareholders, who should
be given standing in every case.143
The defensive measures, discussed above, may be necessary to
protect benefit corporations from hostile bidders who would destroy
the company’s mission. Also, benefit corporation statutes may
properly allow companies like craigslist to avoid shareholder valuecentric outcomes like in the eBay v. Newmark case. However, once
the corporation has willingly entered Revlon-land and decided to sell
the benefit corporation, the measure needs to be financially based. If
the measure were something else—say the environmental friendliness
of the acquirer—the benefit corporation would end up giving itself
away to maximize that non-financial, environmental return. If,
however, the measure were financial, the benefit corporation would
be sold to the buyer who valued the benefit corporation the most, and
the shareholders could use the proceeds as they see fit, including
investing in different socially or environmentally focused companies.
The distinction this paper makes between giving additional
protections to the company’s social mission when Unocal applies, but
requiring a financial focus upon entering Revlon-land, is based on a
belief in the wisdom of director primacy tempered by director
guidance and a small dose of director accountability. 144
141. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 305; Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute

Comparison Chart, supra note 56.
142. Id.

143. The benefit corporation employees are one group that might have a reasonable
argument for being given standing, but it is more likely that employees would use that power to
protect their own jobs and benefits rather than the mission of the benefit corporation.
144. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141(a) (stating that “[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of the
board of directors”); see generally Bainbridge III, supra note 80. The current benefit
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3. Floor for Corporate Giving and Asset Lock
Benefit corporations have been trumpeted as an antidote to
greenwashing, but impact investors and governments may fear that
the current statutes are toothless. 145 To combat the claim of
toothlessness, and in exchange for the state-allowed privilege of
calling their company a “benefit” corporation, the statutes could be
amended to require a floor of corporate charitable giving by benefit
corporations. Perhaps the giving floor could match that which
Patagonia has voluntarily adopted: the greater of one percent of
revenue or 10 percent of profits.
Additionally, benefit corporation statute drafters could consider
a partial asset lock for benefit corporations. To prevent companies
from raising capital for a benefit corporation by promoting
themselves as a “good” company and then quickly selling to the
highest bidder, the statutes could impose a lock on some percentage
of the benefit corporation assets such that some percentage of the
assets are guaranteed to be left behind even if the corporation is
bought and has its benefit corporation status terminated. The
statutes could require that some portion of the assets be given to a
charity with a similar mission to the benefit corporation. 146
One of the major benefits of the benefit corporation legislation
could be the grouping of “good” companies for quick and easy
identification by investors, consumers, and governments for quick and
easy identification. Currently, there is little to nothing in the benefit
corporation statutes that provides assurance of those companies’
“goodness.” 147 The cities of Philadelphia and San Francisco have
corporation statutes provide no guidance and no real accountability. The benefit corporation
directors are required to consider all stakeholders. By creating different formulae to compare
the benefit of one stakeholder group to another, benefit directors could always made an
argument that a sale, to almost any bidder, satisfied their duties. Under Revlon, courts could
impose a bit of accountability on directors who do not seek the best financial deal. Other
solutions are unworkable. Providing directors with no real guidance, by telling them to pursue
the vague “general public benefit,” would simply result in most directors pursuing their own
self-interest. Directing directors to maximize benefit to other stakeholders in a sale situation
would ultimately result in no or minimal financial returns for shareholders.
145. Clark & Vranka, supra note 50, at 2–3 (stating that benefit corporations were created to
help combat the problem of “greenwashing”).
146. The receiving organization should have both the same “top priority” as the benefit
corporation that lost its status, and the receiving organization should be one that has a fair level
of outside oversight, like a charity.
147. Benefit corporation proponents may point to the benefit enforcement proceedings, the
third party standards, and the annual benefit reports as assurance. However, upon closer
examination, none of these lead to confidence. The statutes do not give standing to bring
benefit enforcement proceedings to non-shareholder constituencies and, in any event, monetary
damages are not available. Some of the statutes try to describe the third party standard with
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already started giving preferential treatment to benefit
corporations. 148 Those cities and their taxpayers should be provided
more assurances that the benefit corporations are actually a benefit to
society before giving preferential treatment. If assurance is provided,
through a statutorily required charitable giving floor and/or partial
asset lock, then perhaps more governments would feel comfortable
offering incentives for using the benefit corporation form.
C. DEFENDING PATAGONIA IN PRACTICE
This Section explains how a modified benefit corporation statute
could work in practice using Patagonia as an example. Remember
that for this exercise we are assuming that Patagonia is a publicly
traded benefit corporation. Before deciding to sell, Patagonia could
use various takeover defenses to protect the company. If the state of
incorporation followed the Unocal line of reasoning when evaluating
takeover defenses, the threat to the benefit corporation’s mission (in
Patagonia’s case protecting the environment) could be considered,
even to the extreme detriment of shareholder wealth. 149
If, however, the directors decide to sell or break up the benefit
corporation, then the directors should be required to sell to the
highest bidder, if the state follows Revlon. 150 In contrast to Revlon,
words like “credible” and “comprehensive,” but none of the statutes provide assurance that the
third party standards will be any good. No real oversight of the third party standard makers is
provided. Finally, the statutory description of what the annual benefit reports must contain is
thin, and most of the statues have no enforcement mechanism to deal with benefit corporations
who do not produce the reports. The author’s own research shows that a majority of the early
benefit corporations that formed in Maryland, who should have produced benefit reports as of
the writing of this article, have either not produced reports or have not produced reports that
comply with the statute.
148. City and County of San Francisco Municipal Code, AM. LEGAL PUBL’G CORP.,
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sanfrancisc
o_ca (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (San Francisco provides preferences in government contracting
to California benefit corporations); City of Philadelphia: Tax Credits & Other Incentives, CITY
OF PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS SERVICES, business.phila.gov/pages/taxcreditsotherincentives.
aspx?stage=start&type=all%20business%20types&section=financing%20%26%20incentives&bs
pcontentlistitem=tax%20credits,%20grants%20%26%20other%20incentives (last visited Jan. 30,
2013) (the city of Philadelphia is providing a $4,000 tax credit, for the years 2012 to 2017, to a
maximum of 25 Certified B Corporations per year).
149. See supra Part III; under eBay v. Newark, defensive measures, erected by traditional
Delaware corporations, that “openly eschew” shareholder wealth maximization are at risk of
failing the first prong of Unocal. 16 A.3d 1, 34–35 (Del. Ch. 2010). Benefit corporations,
however, exist to pursue a “general public benefit” and any stated “specific public benefit” of
the entity.
150. See supra Part IV. But see Steven J. Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B
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the current benefit corporation statutes require the consideration of
various stakeholder groups in each decision, including, presumably,
when the sale or break up of the company is envisioned. 151 The
consideration of these various stakeholder groups may be proper
when trying to defend the benefit corporation. However, once the
company is on the auction block, the directors need to know how to
value bids. Revlon creates the best framework for valuing these bids,
based on financial value.
Trying to value the bids based on the benefit corporation’s
mission is simply unworkable. For example, as mentioned above,
requiring the benefit corporation to maximize benefit to the
environment, would result in the benefit corporation basically (or
literally) giving the money away to an environmental organization
that promised to do virtually every environmentally friendly thing
possible. 152 On the other hand, requiring consideration of multiple
constituencies destroys the possibility of any real accountability for
directors. 153 When it has been decided that the company is going to
be sold, maximizing the financial returns is the best directive. The
bidder who values the company the most will receive it, and if the
former shareholders of the benefit corporation wish to invest the
money they received in another benefit corporation or give the
money away, they may. The corporate giving floor and the partial
asset lock, required in this article’s proposed amendments to the
current benefit corporation statutes, would ensure that the benefit
corporation’s mission was not completely abandoned. The approval
of the sale by a super majority of the shareholders, already included
in the current benefit corporation statutes, would provide another
hurdle for companies, like Patagonia, to clear if they wanted to leave
their mission behind in a sale. 154 In short, a modified benefit
corporation statute would create additional mission stickiness, but not
a complete mission lock.

Corporations and the Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (2011)
(arguing that Revlon should not apply in the benefit corporation context).
151. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a); Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute
Comparison Chart, supra note 56.
152. See supra Part VI.B.2.

153. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“A manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity
holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”);
Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW 461, 470 (1992)
(recognizing that “[i]f the board is never made accountable for its decisions, it is liable to
exercise its power irresponsibly vis-a-vis the shareholders.”).
154. See supra Part VI.B.1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this symposium article, Patagonia has served as an example of
a company that wishes to stick to its mission in the face of potential
takeover threats.
There are various defensive measures that
Patagonia could employ to fend off hostile corporate raiders with
inconsistent visions for the company, even if Patagonia were not a
benefit corporation. That said, the benefit corporation statutes come
prepackaged with some useful provisions that increase mission
stickiness, such as super majority voting, a predetermined corporate
purpose, the benefit enforcement proceeding rights, and, in some
states, dissenters’ rights. This article has proposed amending the
current benefit corporation statutes to require benefit corporations to
select a primary non-shareholder stakeholder. The selection of this
primary stakeholder would shine light on the mission of the benefit
corporation for investors, could provide needed guidance for
directors, and would aid courts in determining whether the defensive
measures erected were reasonable in relation to the threats posed.
The article has also proposed the consideration of a statutorily
required charitable giving floor and a partial asset lock to ensure that
the benefit corporations are not merely engaged in greenwashing or
faux corporate social responsibility. Finally, the article has suggested
that Revlon and its progeny could be relevant in the benefit
corporation context, especially if a charitable giving floor and partial
asset lock become statutorily required.
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Appendix A
State

Unocal

Revlon

Constituency
Statute

California

N/A

N/A

No

155

Delaware

Yes

Hawaii

N/A

N/A

Yes

Illinois

N/A

N/A

Yes

Louisiana

N/A

N/A

Yes

Maryland

No

160
162

Yes

156

Yes

161

No

No

New Jersey

N/A

New York

Yes

Pennsylvania

N/A

No

South Carolina

N/A

N/A

No

Vermont

N/A

N/A

Yes

Virginia

No

171

N/A

Yes

N/A

Yes

No

No

166
168

172

158
159

No

Massachusetts

165

157

Yes
Yes

Yes

163
164
167
169

170
173

155. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
156. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
157. HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(a), (b) (West 2011).
158. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2011).
159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West 2011).
160. Shenker v. Laureat Educ., Inc., 983 A.2d 408, 427 (Md. 2009).
161. Id. at 421–22 (2009).
162. Seidman v. Central Bancorp, Inc., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 383, 2003 WL 21528509 at *9-10
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2003).
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2011).
164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2011).
165. Int’l Banknote Co., Inc. v. Muller, 713 F.Supp. 612, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
166. Minzer v. Keegan, No. CV-97-4077(CPS), 1997 WL 34842191, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 1997).
167. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2011).
168. Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat. Financial Corp., 675 F.Supp. 238, 265-66 (M.D. Pa. Jun
30, 1987).
169. 15 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a), (b) (West 2012); see also 15 PA CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 515(a), (b) (West 2012).
170. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (West 2011).
171. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tysons, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 419, 421–22 (W.D. Va. 1994)
172. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 50 Va. Cir. 558,
6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998).
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (West 2011).
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Appendix B
State

Shareholder
Approval for
Merger
(traditional
corporation)

California

Majority

Delaware

Majority

Hawaii

Majority

Illinois

Two-thirds

Louisiana

Two-thirds

Maryland

Two-thirds

Massachusetts

Two-thirds

New Jersey

Majority

New York

Majority

174
177
178
181
184
187
190

193
196

Shareholder
Approval for
Adoption of
Benefit
Corporation Status
Two-Thirds

175

Two-Thirds

N/A
Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds

Shareholder
Approval for
Termination of
Benefit Corporation
Status
176

N/A
179

Two-Thirds

182

Two-Thirds

185

Two-Thirds

188

Two-Thirds

191

Two-Thirds

194

Three-Fourths

Two-Thirds
197

180
183
186
189
192
195

Three-Fourths

198

174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 2012).
175. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14603 (West 2012).
176. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14604 (West 2012).
177. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 251 (West 2012).
178. HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-313 (West 2012).
179. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-3 (West 2011).
180. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-4 (West 2011).
181. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 805 § 5/11.20 (West 2012).
182. ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 § 40/2.05 (West 2012).
183. ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 § 40/2.10 (West 2012).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:112 (2012).
185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1804 (2012).
186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1805 (2012).
187. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-105 (West 2012).
188. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-03 (West 2011).
189. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-04 (West 2011).
190. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 46B (West 2012).
191. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 5 (West 2012).
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 6 (West 2012).
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3 (West 2012) (in the case of a corporation organized prior to
January 1, 1969 it must be by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shareholders).
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-3 (West 2011).
195. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-4 (West 2011).
196. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 2012) (in the case of a corporation organized
prior to existence of the current law it must be by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
shareholders).
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199

Pennsylvania

Majority

South Carolina

Two-thirds

Vermont

Majority

Virginia

Two-thirds

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

202

205
208

Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds
Two-Thirds

200

Two-Thirds

203

Two-Thirds

206

All Shareholders

N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1704 (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1705 (McKinney 2012).
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1924 (West 2012).
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (West 2012).
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3305 (West 2012).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-103 (2012).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-210 (2012).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-220 (2012).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 11.03 (West 2012).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.05-06 (West 2011).
VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11A, §§ 21.06-07 (West 2011).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718 (West 2012).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-785 (West 2012).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-786 (West 2012).

Two-Thirds
209

Two-Thirds
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201
204
207
210

